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The relevance of transport costs has increased as liberalization continues to 
reduce artificial barriers to trade. Countries need to adopt policies to “get closer” 
to global markets. Can improvements in infrastructure and regulation reduce 
transport costs? Is it worthwhile to implement policies designed to increase 
competition in transport markets? Focusing on air transport, which has increased 
its share in US imports from 24 percent in 1990 to 35 percent in 2000, this paper 
quantifies the effects of infrastructure, regulatory quality and liberalization of air 
cargo markets on transport costs. During the 1990s, the US implemented a series 
of Open Skies agreements, which have provided a unique opportunity to assess 
the effect on prices of a change in the competition regime. We find that 
infrastructure, quality of regulation and competition matter. In our sample, an 
improvement in airport infrastructure from the 25
th to 75
th percentiles reduces air 
transport costs 15 percent. A similar improvement in the quality of regulation 
reduces air transport costs 14 percent. In addition, Open Skies agreements reduce 
air transport costs by 8 percent. 
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quality. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
There is a close relationship between trade costs and a country’s ability to increase its exports 
and integrate into the world economy. The relevance of transport costs as a component of trade 
costs has been increasing as liberalization continues to reduce artificial barriers to trade. In many 
cases, the effective rate of protection provided by transport costs is higher than the one provided 
by tariffs (Clark, Dollar and Micco, 2004; Hummels, 1999).  
One of the most important and evident components of transport costs is distance.  In its 
simplest formulation, the gravity model for trade, introduced by Linnemmann (1966), states that 
bilateral trade flows depend positively on the product of the GDPs of both economies and 
negatively on the distance between them, which stands for bilateral transport costs. The impact 
of distance on countries’ volume of trade is significant: recent estimates of the elasticity of trade 
volumes with respect to distance indicate that when distance increases by 10 percent, the volume 
of trade is reduced between 9 and 15 percent (Overman, Redding and Venables, 2003).
2  
In addition to distance, however, many other elements influence transport costs. As 
explained by Limão and Venables (2001), transport costs and trade volumes depend on many 
complex details of geography, infrastructure, administrative barriers and the state of competition 
in the transport industry. Provided that distance and infrastructure-related costs are major 
determinants of the success of a country’s export sector, immediate questions arise: what can 
governments do to “get closer” to markets with high import demand? Can improvements in 
infrastructure and regulation reduce transport costs? Is it worthwhile to implement policies 
designed to increase competition in transport markets? Do these policies have a quantifiable 
impact on transport costs?  
Not many papers have tried to estimate the impact on transport costs of policies that 
improve the quality of regulation and infrastructure or implement new competition regimes. 
Focusing on infrastructure and using data from maritime shipping companies, Limão and 
Venables (2001) show that poor infrastructure accounts for more than 40 percent of predicted 
transport costs. In a study specific to the port sector, Clark, Dollar and Micco (2004) show that 
an improvement in port efficiency from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile reduces shipping costs by 
                                                       
2 Deardorff (1984) surveys the early work on this subject. 
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more than 12 percent.
3 Fink, Matoo and Neagu (2002) argue that both public policies, like 
restrictions on the provision of port services, and private practices—e.g., collusive carrier 
arrangements—exercise a significant influence on maritime transport costs. A policy implication 
derived from their estimation is the need to pursue attempts to break up international cartels in 
that market.
4  Because their data do not include a change in the intensity of competition in the 
market (i.e., from cartel to non-collusive behavior), they cannot estimate the effects on transport 
costs of a change in the competition regime. 
The aim of this paper is to close this gap in the literature. In particular, we estimate the 
effects of infrastructure, quality of regulation and changes in the competition regime on air 
transport costs. We focus exclusively on the costs of air transport due to its increasing 
importance as a transport mode, the availability of detailed micro data for US imports and the 
recent change in competition regimes introduced by Open Skies agreements.  
The advent of wide-body aircrafts in the 1970s made large volumes of belly space 
available. Once airlines were able to accept palletized or containerized freight, they began 
addressing the air cargo market more aggressively. As the evolution and design of aircrafts made 
it possible to carry more cargo in an efficient manner, dedicated cargo airlines entered this 
market.
5 
The size of the airfreight and express market worldwide is approximately USD 75 billion, 
and during the 1990s this market grew at an average rate of 6 percent per year.
6 The geographic 
distribution of the revenue generated in the air cargo and air passenger markets are similar; in 
both markets the US accounts for almost 40 percent of total revenue. In the United States, as 
indicated by Figure 1, the value of air shipments relative to the aggregate value of air and vessel 
shipments increased from 24 percent in 1990 to 35 percent in 2000. The drastic drop in air 
                                                       
3 Clark, Dollar and Micco (2004) show that reductions in country inefficiencies associated with transport costs from 
the 25
th to 75
th percentiles imply an increase in bilateral trade of around 25 percent. 
4 Clark, Dollar and Micco (2004) show that their results are not robust to the inclusion of additional control variables 
(e.g., unit value of the shipped merchandise).  
5 As Walker (1999) explains, until recently, the majority of airlines considered cargo a by-product of their passenger 
activities. The consequence was a pricing strategy that regarded cargo as a low additional cost product. In recent 
times, airlines have significantly improved the way common costs are allocated and have implemented a yield 
management strategy, which involves the creation of a stand-alone company with full profit responsibility. 
6 Data obtained from Air Cargo Management Group (www.cargofacts.com). 
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shipments in 2001 may have been caused by the restrictions that the US applied to air traffic 
after September 11, 2001.
7  
 
































































































Share: Value of Air Shipments / (Value of Air Shipments and Vessel Shipments). 
Source: U.S.  Imports of Merchandise 1990-2001, U.S. Department of Commerce.   
 
 
In 1992 the United States signed the first Open Skies agreement with the Netherlands. 
Since then, the United States has signed more than fifty-five Open Skies agreements with 
developed and developing countries on all continents. These agreements give us a unique 
opportunity to estimate the effect that a liberalized air cargo market has on transport costs. Given 
that there is no estimation in the literature of the effects of Open Skies agreements, or any other 
change in competition regime, on cargo rates, this paper adds a new dimension to the literature 
on the determinants of transport costs. 
 
                                                       
7 According to data provided by the Air Transport Association, the recent evolution of international cargo transport 
for US airlines (measured in millions of ton miles) is as follows: 1999: 23,501; 2000: 25,121; 2001: 22,421; 2002: 
23,627; 2003: 24,198 (estimated data).  
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Table 1. Bilateral Open Skies Agreements, United States 
Year Country Year Country  Year Country 
2002 Jamaica  1999 Dominican Republic  1997 El Salvador 
2002 Cape  Verde  1999 Tanzania 1997 Guatemala 
2002 Uganda  1999 Qatar  1997 Panama 
2001 Sri Lanka   1999 Argentina  1997 Taiwan 
2001 France  1999 Bahrain  1997 Brunei 
2001 Oman   1999 United Arab Emirates  1997 Singapore 
2001 Poland  1999 Pakistan  1996 Jordan 
2000 Senegal  1998 Italy  1996 Germany 
2000 Benin  1998 Peru  1995 Czech  Republic 
2000 Malta  1998 Korea   1995 Austria 
2000 Rwanda   1998 Uzbekistan  1995 Belgium 
2000 Morocco  1997 Netherlands  Antilles  1995 Denmark 
2000 Nigeria  1997 Romania  1995 Finland 
2000 The  Gambia  1997 Chile  1995 Iceland 
2000 Turkey  1997 Aruba  1995 Luxembourg 
2000 Ghana  1997 Malaysia  1995 Norway 
2000 Burkina  Faso  1997 New Zealand  1995 Sweden 
2000 Namibia  1997 Nicaragua  1995 Switzerland 
2000 Slovak Republic  1997 Costa Rica   1992 Netherlands 
1999 Portugal  1997 Honduras       




The results obtained have important policy implications. We find strong evidence that 
investments in airport infrastructure and improvements in the quality of regulation reduce air 
transport costs. In our sample, improvements in both variables from the 25th percentile to the 
75th percentile reduce transport costs by more than 20 percent. In addition, we find that a more 
competitive air transport market—through Open Skies agreements—reduces air transport costs 
by around 8 percent.
8  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the economics of air 
cargo. Section 3 presents the empirical framework, while Section 4 shows the results for the 
cross section and panel data estimation. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                       
8 This result depends on the econometric specification used. 
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2.  The Determinants of Air Transport Costs, the Economics of Air Cargo  
and Open Skies Agreements 
 
This section addresses, based on a qualitative description, the main determinants of air transport 
costs, emphasizing recent developments in the economics of air cargo.  
  The nature of the services provided by air cargo airlines forces them to be both capital- 
intensive and transnational companies serving more than one country. In general, these 
companies have access to international capital markets and they are able to hire a fraction of their 
workers from all over the world.
9 Thus we should not expect differences in capital or labor costs 
to be the main factors explaining differences in transport costs across countries. However there 
are other important specific factors affecting transport costs across countries, which we present 
next. 
  The most studied determinant of transport cost is geography, particularly distance. The 
greater the distance between two markets, the higher the expected transport costs. For air 
carriers, the cost variable most affected by distance is fuel cost, which during most of the 1990s 
represented between 12 and 15 percent of airlines’ total operating costs (Doganis, 2001). 
  Dedicated freight airlines pay special attention to airport use-related fees. They have 
more flexibility than passenger airlines, as they do not have to operate from airports with the best 
location for business passengers, they can avoid slot-constrained airports, and they can operate 
during off-peak hours. Consequently, dedicated freight airlines usually have a broader selection 
of competing airports to choose from. The available airport infrastructure and the quality of 
regulation, which have a direct impact on airport use fees, are important variables for cargo 
airlines when deciding which airports they serve, and thus are relevant variables in the 
determination of air transport costs. 
  There is no single model for tariff regulation in airports. In the majority of airports, 
however, tariffs for “aeronautical services” (runway and taxiway, air control, aircraft parking, 
security) are regulated by a government agency or sector-specific regulator (Serebrisky and 
Presso, 2002). The quality of regulation  (i.e., the level and structure of tariffs for aeronautical 
                                                       
9 Doganis (2001) shows that for passenger airlines labor costs explain 25 to 35 percent of total operating costs. 
Undoubtedly, for dedicated freight carriers, this percentage is much lower because they do not need to employ flight 
attendants and other personnel who work in passenger-related services (e.g., VIP lounges, check-in counters, 
customer service personnel in airports, etc.).  
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services, how they are set and the regulatory process to modify them) is a key factor that directly 
impacts airlines’ operating costs and transport costs. 
The creation of cargo-dedicated airlines and the implementation of yield management 
strategies in passenger-cargo airlines allowed these companies to adopt a flexible approach to the 
selling of cargo space. As a consequence, there are not only directional differences in rates, 
mainly due to bilateral trade imbalances,
10 but there are also wide variations in the rates offered 
to bulk contract shippers as opposed to one-off clients.
11 
Trade composition additionally helps to explain other differences in transport costs. Due 
to the insurance component of transport costs, products with higher unit value have higher 
charges per unit of weight. On average, insurance fees are around 1.75 percent of the traded 
value and represent around 15 percent of total air charges. Therefore, high value-added exporting 
countries should have higher charges per unit of weight due to this insurance component.
12 
Besides, some products require special transport features and therefore have different freight 
rates.
13 
Finally, competition regimes also matter for air transport costs. Since 1992, the United 
States has signed more than fifty bilateral Open Skies agreements. The main objective sought by 
these agreements is the promotion of an international aviation system based on competition 
among airlines with minimum government regulation. As stated in the introduction of these 
agreements,
14 the motivation governments have for supporting them is the desire to facilitate the 
expansion of air transport opportunities, making it possible for airlines to offer the traveling and 
shipping public a variety of service options at the lowest possible prices. 
The substance of all Open Skies agreements signed by the United States is alike, and 
apply to passenger, all-cargo and combination air transportation and encompass both scheduled 
and charter services. Key provisions include the following:
15 
                                                       
10 Directional imbalance in trade between countries implies that many air-carriers are forced to haul empty space 
back. As a result, either imports or exports become more expensive. 
11 Transport is a classic example of an industry that faces increasing return to scale. 
12 Clark, Dollar and Micco (2004) show that the insurance component is an important determinant of maritime 
transport costs as well. 
13 For example, in the case of maritime transport costs, LSU (1998) shows that the average freight rates between 
Central America and Miami for cooled load merchandise are about twice the transport cost for textiles.  
14 The text of open skies agreements can be found at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/ 
15 For a detailed explanation and examples see http://state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/208.htm 
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Free market competition: No restrictions on international route rights; number of 
designated airlines; capacity; frequencies; and types of aircraft. 
Pricing determined by market forces: A fare can be disallowed only if both governments 
concur (“double disapproval pricing”) and only for certain, specified reasons intended to ensure 
competition. 
Fair and equal opportunity to compete: All carriers of both countries may establish sales 
offices in the other country, and all carriers can convert and remit earnings in hard currencies at 
any time. Besides, designated airlines are free to provide their own ground handling services and 
airlines and cargo consolidators may arrange ground transport of air cargo and are guaranteed 
access to customs services. According to the model text of Open Skies Agreements, user charges 
cannot be discriminatory and should be based on costs. The text also includes procedures for 
resolving differences that arise under the agreement. 
Optional seventh freedom all-cargo rights: Provide authority for an airline of one country 
to operate all-cargo services between the other country and a third country, via flights that are 
not linked to its homeland. Most of the Open Skies agreements signed by the United States 
include seventh freedom for all-cargo services. 
The inclusion of specific provisions for air cargo in the Open Skies agreements signed by 
the United States suggests that, irrespective of the size of the air cargo market, the American 
government is concerned about entry barriers, competition and ultimately prices of air cargo 
services. 
Most of the empirical literature in the area of air transport focuses on the effects of Open 
Skies agreements on passengers. A recent and comprehensive study (Brattle Group, 2002) 
estimates the effects on passengers of Open Skies agreements between the United States and 
countries in the European Union. Button (2002) describes the potential effects that the 
liberalization of U.S-European air transport market could have on airlines, passengers and labor, 
but he does not provide any quantitative evidence. The U.S. Department of Transportation 
(2000) published a report that argues that between 1996 and 1999 average passenger airfares in 
transatlantic markets declined 10.3 percent in non-Open Skies countries and 20.1 percent in 
Open Skies countries. This report neither controls for other factors nor explains the methodology 
used to estimate the reduction in airfares.  
  11 
Despite some work on the effects of Open Skies on passenger fares, a survey of the 
empirical literature shows that there is no estimation of the effects of Open Skies agreements on 
cargo rates, a task we pursue in this paper. 
 
3. Empirical Framework  
  
To estimate the importance of each of the factors that explain air transport costs, we use a 
standard reduced form approach. Air transport freight prices are assumed to be equal to the 
marginal cost multiplied by the air shipping companies’ markup. Expressed in logarithms, the 
reduced form equation takes the following form: 
 
) , , , ( ) , , , ( t k j I t k j I mc p Ijkt µ + =    (1) 
 
where: 
I : corresponds to a foreign country; 
j : corresponds to a US district or region;  
k: corresponds to the product, aggregated at four digits of the HS classification 
code; 
ijkt p : air transport cost (or charges);  
mc : marginal cost expressed in logarithm; and  
µ : markup expressed in logarithm. 
 
Therefore,   represents air transport costs Ijkt p 16 (freight charges), and it is measured by 
the logarithm of the freight charges per unit of weight for each of the k products transported 
between foreign country I to any of the US districts or regions j in period t.
 1718  
We assume that both marginal cost and markup are functions of factors that depend on 
the airport or country of origin (I), and the airport or district of destiny in the US (j) for each of 
the k product types. Specifically, we assume that the marginal cost has the following functional 
form: 
 
                                                       
16 We do not take into account the observations that have zero trade with the U.S.  
17 We consider 36 US districts. 
18 We divide the districts into three regions. 
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jkt Ij Ijt
jt Ij jkt k j
I APE unb
qI d wvI t k j I mc
ε ω κ
η ϑ ψ λ α
+ + +
+ + + + = ) , , , (
    (2) 
where: 
j α : dummy variable referring to US district j;  
k λ   : dummy variable referring to product k; 
Ijkt wv : represents the logarithm of the value per unit of weight of product k; 
Ij d : logarithm of the distance between country I and district j in the US; 
Ijt q : logarithm of the value of imports carried by air from country I to the US; 
Ijt unb : imbalance between country I and the US; and 
I APE : state of infrastructure in airports of foreign country I. 
 
The first dummy takes into account potential differences in airport efficiencies across US 
custom regions or districts, and the second accounts for different marginal transport costs across 
products.  represents the value per unit of weight of product k and is used as a proxy for the 
insurance component of air transport cost (p
ijkt wv
Ijkt).
19  The imbalance between country I and the US 
corresponds to the ratio between US exports minus US imports and the level of bilateral trade 
between the two countries. The variable   is a proxy for the state of infrastructure in foreign 
airports and corresponds to the ratio between the squared number of airports in the foreign 
country that have runways over 1,500 meters long and the product of the country area and total 
population. In addition, in some specifications we include variables that capture the quality of 
regulation across countries. 
I APE
With respect to the second term of the reduced form equation, we assume that air 
shipping companies’ markups have the following functional form:  
 
IJt k A t k j I ϕ ρ µ + = ) , , , (    (3) 
where: 
k ρ : dummy variable per product k; and 
                                                       
19  We assume that insurance costs increase unit prices of transported goods. 
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IJt A : dummy variable for Open Skies Agreements between country I and the US. 
 
k ρ is a product-specific dummy variable that captures differences in transport demand elasticities 
across goods (derived from the final demand of each good k in the US). AIJt is a variable that 
specifies whether a pair of countries has an Open Skies Agreement.  
Substituting the second and third equations into the first, we obtain the econometric 
model to be estimated: 
 
Ijkt Ijt Ij
Ijt Ijt Ij Ijkt k j Ijkt
A APE
unb q d wv p
ε ϕ ω
κ η ψ β α
+ + +








β + ≡ ; and  
Ijk ε : error term.
20 
 
In the estimation, we should expect a positive sign for the coefficients of the proxy for 
insurance costs, ψ , and distance,  , and a negative sign for the coefficients of the volume of 
trade,
∂
η , trade unbalance, κ , the state of airport infrastructure, ω, and Open Skies agreements, 
ϕ.  
We divide our empirical results into two sets. First, we run cross-sectional regressions to 
identify the effects on transport costs of those variables that rarely or never vary over time. These 
variables are distance and foreign airport infrastructure. Using cross-sectional regressions we are 
able to identify whether countries that implemented an Open Skies Agreement face lower or 
higher transport costs than others that did not. Although this information by itself is valuable, it 
is not precisely the most relevant question for a policymaker. A policymaker would like to know 
what is the impact of signing Open Skies Agreements; that is, if by implementing this type of 
agreement, transport costs are reduced over time. 
To answer this question, our second set of results relies on panel data and includes 
country fixed effects in order to isolate the time series dimension of Open Skies Agreements and 
                                                       
20 We allow the error term to be correlated among country clusters. 
  14 
their impact on air transport costs, leaving out the cross-sectional variation. Thus, time-invariant 
country specific variables such as distance between a foreign country and the US will be 
subsumed in these country fixed effects. In addition, to some extent, the inclusion of country 
dummies addresses potential endogeneity problems that would arise if countries following a 
cost-benefit analysis tend to invest in an Open Skies Agreement only with partners with which 
they have high air transport costs, since the potential benefits for these countries derived from 
greater competition will be higher. If this were the case, a cross-sectional analysis would 
underestimate the effect of Open Skies Agreements on transport costs. Indeed, as will be shown 
below, a comparison of our panel results with those obtained when we use cross section 
regressions suggests that the latter in fact understate the impact of Open Skies Agreements on air 
transport costs.
21 
It is important to point out that the use of country dummies does not fully eliminate the 
endogeneity bias. It is possible that countries decide to sign an open skies agreement following a 
substantial increase in their air transport costs. The shorter the period used to estimate the effect 
since the implementation of Open Skies Agreements, the less severe are the remaining concerns 
about endogeneity.
22 In any case, if endogeneity were a problem, one would expect our estimates 
to underestimate the effect of Open Skies Agreement on transport costs. 
The relation between transport costs and imported volume causes an additional 
endogeneity problem. To control for this endogeneity problem, in the empirical section, 
following the gravity literature on trade, we use the foreign country’s GDP as an instrument for 
the volume of imports.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Data on air-transport costs are drawn from the U.S. Imports of Merchandise Database compiled 
by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The level of data aggregation is HS four-digit, and the 
period covered is 1990-2001.  Our dependent variable, air-transport costs, is the variable imports 
charges (by unit of weight), which is defined by the U.S. Bureau of Census as “the aggregate 
cost of all freight, insurance, and other charges (excluding U.S. import duties) incurred in 
                                                       
21 Glick and Rose (2001) and Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2003) use this same technique to identify the respective 
effects of currency union and EMU on trade.   
22 For this reason, our short period of time is perfect for estimating the effect of open skies. 
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bringing the merchandise from alongside the carrier at the port of exportation—in the country of 
exportation—and placing it alongside the carrier at the first port of entry in the United States.”
23   
Our explanatory variables are HS four-digit aggregated, and they were obtained from 
different sources. In the case of value of imports, volume of imports and directional unbalance,
24 
the source is the U.S. Imports of Merchandise Database gathered by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 1990 - 2001. Population and GDP data were obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (2002). Most of the country-specific variables (coordinates for the 
calculation of distances, number of airports, etc.) were taken from the CIA’s World Factbook.
25 
Finally, the information for regulatory quality and government efficiency were taken from 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003). Details on the definition of the variables are provided in 
Appendix A.  
 
Cross Sectional Results 
 
Cross Sectional results are reported in Table 1 and Table 2. The main difference between these 
tables is that in Table 2 we control for country development level using a dummy variable for 
developed countries.
26 Both tables report the results for the year 2000. We chose the year 2000 
because it was the only year for which we had information to construct the variable directional 
trade imbalance.   
Table 1 reports our estimations for equation [4]. In all the specifications we control for 
distance, volume (US imports measured in US dollars), product unit value, directional trade 
unbalance, type of product and district of cargo entry in the US and airport infrastructure in the 
exporter country. Furthermore, in all the specifications we allow the error term to be correlated 
among country clusters to avoid misspecifications of the var-cov matrix.
27 As mentioned above, 
when we introduce import volume, an endogeneity problem arises. It is expected that the bigger 
the trade volume, the lower transport costs are going to be (due to economies of scale) but, on the 
                                                       
23 To avoid a measurement error, in our empirical exercises we only use countries that have 50 or more observations 
in our sample. Our results are robust to the inclusion of those countries with fewer than 50 observations. 
24 This variable was only available for the year 2000. 
25 We obtained the number of airports from the CIA World Fact Book, 1990-2001. 
26 To control for this country-specific characteristic, we constructed a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
country is classified by the World Bank Income Classification as a high income country, and zero in all other cases. 
27 Clusters control for the fact that, even though we use thousands of air-shipping observations, most of our variables 
of interest vary only across countries. 
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other hand, lower transport costs may increase trade. To solve this problem in all specifications 
shown, we instrumentalize imports volume using countries’ GDP.
28 
Column (1) reports the results obtained for the benchmark regression specified in 
equation [4] using the square number of large airports in the foreign country normalized by area 
and population as our measure of airport infrastructure. As shown, distance has a significant (at 1 
percent) and positive effect on air transport costs. For instance, doubling the distance between a 
country I and the US generates a 20 percent increase in air transport costs. The variable capturing 
economies of scale is the level of trade that goes through a particular route.
29 This variable, 
calculated in terms of monetary volume, has the expected significant and negative coefficient. 
This result could be explained by the fact that the more transited routes are served by the biggest 
airplanes, which have more cargo space available, or have more competition due to the presence 
of more cargo companies covering the same route. In our sample, an increase in import volume 
from the level of Zimbabwe (25
th percentile) to the level of Denmark (75
th percentile) reduces air 
transport costs by around 11 percent. 
The value per weight variable is also positive and highly significant. As mentioned 
above, these regressions include dummy variables for products aggregated at the four-digit HS 
level. One might think that unit values would be quite similar across countries at that level of 
disaggregation, but that is not the case. Clark, Dollar and Micco (2004) found the same results 
for maritime transport costs. Additionally, Feenstra (1996) shows that there is a large variation in 
unit values even at the 10-digit HS level. He cites the example of cotton shirts for men, which the 
U.S. imports from almost half of its 162 trading partners. The unit values range from $56 (Japan) 
to $1 (Senegal). These differences in unit values lead to large differences in insurance costs per 
kilogram, even for “homogeneous” products. Thus, it is not surprising that the more expensive 
the product per unit of weight, the higher the insurance and hence the overall transport cost. 
Directional imbalance in trade between the US and the source country has the expected 
negative sign and is significant at one percent. If we move from a favorable unbalance (from the 
                                                       
28 Following the gravity model, trade between two countries is proportional to the product of countries’ GDP 
divided by the distance between them. 
29 Each “foreign country and US region” pair is defined as an air route. We define three regions in the US: East, 
West and Gulf Coast (see Appendix B, Table B4). 
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point of view of the exporters to the US
30) of 50 percent to a negative one of the same amount, 
air transport costs increase around 16 percent. 
Finally, the coefficient associated with airport infrastructure is negative and significant 
(at 1 percent): the greater the investment in infrastructure, the lower transport costs are. In our 
sample, an improvement in airport infrastructure from the level of Colombia (25
th percentile) to 
the level of Great Britain (75
th percentile) reduces air transport costs by 15 percent. This result 
may be due to the following reverse causality: airport infrastructure reduces air transport costs, 
but at the same time, low air transport costs increase trade and may induce investments in airport 
infrastructure. To control for this reverse causality in column (2), we instrumentalize the level of 
foreign airport infrastructure of column (1) with indexes of telephones per capita and paved 
roads. In addition, as a robustness test, in column (3) we use a five-year lag of our infrastructure 
variable. In both cases we obtain very significant effects, similar to the results obtained in 
column (1).  
In columns (4), (5) and (6), besides the level of airport infrastructure, we include 
institutional variables to observe their effect on air transport costs. We should expect a better 
institutional framework—measured by regulatory quality and/or government efficiency—to 
reduce air transport costs.
31 In columns (4) to (6), we present our results using regulatory quality 
and/or government efficiency obtained from Kaufmann et al. (2003).
32 As shown separately, both 
dimensions have the expected sign, and both are statistically significant at conventional levels 
(Columns 4 and 5). But, when we include both institutional variables at the same time, only 
regulatory quality has the expected sign and is significant at standard levels.
33 Not surprisingly, 
this last result suggests that regulatory quality, which should directly affect airport efficiency, 
has a significant effect on air transport costs. In our sample, a country that increases its level of 
regulatory quality from the level of Ecuador (25
th percentile) to the level of France (75
th 
perecnetile) can experience a reduction in its air transport costs of 14 percent.  
                                                       
30 For foreign exporters, the larger the imbalance of US bilateral trade (exports – imports divided by bilateral trade), 
the lower their transport costs should be because of the low capacity utilization of airplanes returning to the United 
States.  
31 See Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) for a general discussion of the role of the institutional environment in 
country performance. 
32 To check the robustness of these results, we estimated the benchmark equation with Rule of Law and Control of 
Corruption, and we found that the results obtained were very similar in magnitude of coefficients and in level of 
significance.  
33 The lack of significance of government efficiency may come from the fact that both institutional variables are 
highly correlated in our sample. 
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The last two columns of Table 1 report the results when we include our Open Skies 
agreement dummy variable
34 with and without regulatory quality. In both cases, Open Skies 
agreement has the expected negative sign, but it is not statistically different from zero at 
conventional levels. It is possible that this result is biased to zero due to the endogeneity problem 
described at the beginning of this section (countries with initial high transport cost are willing to 
sign Open Skies agreements).  
Additional regressions, which are not reported, show that our results are robust to the use 
of other years in our sample instead of 2000.
35  
To see if our results are robust to the addition of country-income controls, in Table 2 we 
include, in all specifications, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the foreign country 
is a developed country (high income country), and zero otherwise. We found that all our 
previous results are robust to the inclusion of this dummy, except for the total volume variable, 
which keeps its negative sign in all specifications but is not statistically different from zero. The 
variables of airport infrastructure and regulatory quality keep their negative signs, but their 
effects on air transport costs are slightly smaller. These results are not surprising if we take into 
account that most of the observed variance experienced by airport infrastructure and regulatory 
quality occurs between developing and developed countries, which is now captured by our 
developed country dummy. Controlling by infrastructure and regulatory quality, on average, 
developed countries have 14 percent lower air transport cost than the other countries in our 
sample.   
 
Panel Data Results 
 
In the cross section estimations we mentioned the possibility that the estimated coefficients of 
Open Skies Agreements might be biased to zero. To solve this problem, Table 3 presents the 
results of a country-product fixed effect estimation for the period 1990–2001. The inclusion of 
country-product dummies allows us to focus on the time series effect of Open Skies Agreements. 
The country-product fixed effect captures the initial level of transport costs as well as those 
                                                       
34 The dummy variable that accounts for the existence of an Open Skies Agreement between partner countries was 
obtained from the U.S. Department of Transportation. In the introduction of this paper, Table 1 presents a table with 
all Open Skies Agreements and the years they were signed.  
35 For all other years we have to use the year 2000 imbalance.
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variables that do not change over time (for example, distance).
36 As we did in the cross section 
estimation, we still allow the error term to be correlated within countries in a given year, and we 
control for US region or district fixed effects. 
In column (1) we report the results obtained when we allow the average air transport 
costs to follow a linear trend. As we found in the cross section regressions, volume has a 
negative sign but is not significant at standard levels. Unit weight values remain highly 
significant with a similar coefficient. More interestingly, in our panel setup, Open Skies 
Agreements remains negative and becomes significant at standard levels. This result is robust 
even when we control with a quadratic trend (column 2), dummies for years (column 3) and US 
district fixed instead of US region dummies (column 4). The result also holds when we include 
our measure of airport infrastructure, which has an estimated value of zero and has no statistical 
power. This low power may be explained by the low time variability of our airport infrastructure 
measure.
37  
The results in columns (1) to (5) suggest that, even though statistically significant, Open 
Skies Agreements imply only a small decline in air transport costs of around 2.3 percent. This is 
the average effect of Open Skies Agreement on freight rates independent of the number of years 
the agreement has been in effect. Open Skies Agreements may reduce freight rates over time, in 
which case the total effect of these agreements would be larger than 2.3 percent. We want to test 
the hypothesis that air carriers take time to adapt to the new rules in the market and need to go 
through an underlying “learning by doing” process. A similar hypothesis, which cannot be tested 
separately with the available data, would be that those firms that survive after Open Skies 
Agreements are signed, are more efficient and, given the existence of more contestable markets, 
they set lower tariffs. The process of fighting to survive is not a one-period game, and that would 
explain why freight rates decrease over time. To test the first hypothesis, columns (6) to (8) 
compute the previous regressions using only the years 1990 and 2001.
38 Using this “type” of first 
difference regression,
39 the dummy for Open Sky Agreements captures the fall in freight rates for 
                                                       
36  We do not include our institutional variables because they have only been available since 1996 and change very 
little over time. In most specifications we do not include our measure of airport infrastructure because it hardly 
changes over time.  
37 Most improvements in airport infrastructure over time are within the same airport (e.g., equipment), and therefore 
are not captured in our measure. 
38 We drop countries that are not in the whole sample to avoid any composition effect (two countries). Results hold 
with the whole sample.  
39 These would be first difference regressions if there were only one district of entry in the US. 
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the whole period since the agreement was signed in each country. For example, as Spain signed 
an Open Skies agreement with the US in 1995, in the year 2001 the agreement had been standing 
for 6 years. In column (6) the agreement dummy implies a large drop in freight rates of around 9 
percent. When we include our infrastructure measure in column (7), the fall in freight rates 
increases to 13 percent. In this specification our infrastructure variable is significant at 10 
percent levels, and it has a magnitude similar to that obtained in column (2) of Table 1. Finally, 
to confirm that the effect of agreements increases over time, in columns (8) and (9), besides our 
Open Sky dummy, we include the number of years since the agreement was signed. Confirming 
our previous results, the interaction term is negative and significant at conventional levels. These 
results, even though they are significant at conventional levels, are estimated imprecisely. 
To check the results of the previous paragraph, Table 4 presents country-product fixed 
effect regressions for the whole sample period (as in columns 1-5 in Table 3), but allowing the 
effect of Open Skies agreements to differ over time. The dummy “Year of Signature” captures 
the change in freight rates the same year the agreement was signed. The dummy “One Year 
After” captures the change the first year after the agreement was signed. Finally, the dummies 
“Four or More Years After” captures the average fall in freight rates after four or more years 
since the agreement was signed. Columns (1) to (4) show similar results. In the year the 
agreement is signed there is a 1 percent fall in freight rates. This fall increases 1 percent per year 
after the agreement is signed.
40 Three years after the agreement was signed we observe a 3-4 
percent fall in rates, which is significant at conventional levels in all the specifications. Focusing 
on columns (2) and (4), the long-run effect of Open Skies agreements is a fall in air transport 
costs of around 8 percent. It is important to highlight that this result does not allow us to identify 
the source of the reduction in air transport costs associated with Open Skies agreements. It could 
be the case that costs are lower because a more intense competition induced a lower mark-up. An 
alternative explanation consistent with the reduction in transport costs would be that airlines 
became more efficient, and keeping mark-ups constant, were able to reduce freight rates. 
 
                                                       
40 In all specifications, the sum of the first three dummies (“Year of Signature,” “One Year After” and “Two Years 
After”) is significant at conventional levels.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s many countries engaged in a process of reduction of tariff and non-
tariff barriers to trade. As a consequence, the relevance of transport costs as a determinant of the 
ability of a country to integrate into the global economy increased significantly. At first glance, it 
could be argued that governments cannot reduce transport costs because they are, to a great 
extent, determined by exogenous factors, mainly distance. Even though it is true that distance is 
an important explanatory variable of transport costs, this paper shows that governments can 
implement different policies to reduce transport costs and effectively help their countries “get 
closer” to high demand markets.  
This paper concentrates on air transport, the fastest-growing cargo transport mode. 
Relying on detailed micro data and the opportunity that Open Skies Agreements provide to 
evaluate the impact of changes in the competition regime, our estimations show that 
improvements in infrastructure and the quality of regulation and a more liberal air cargo market 
significantly reduce transport costs. In our sample, an improvement in airport infrastructure from 
the 25
th to 75
th percentiles reduces air transport costs 15 percent. A similar improvement in the 
quality of regulation reduces air transport costs 14 percent. Besides, deregulating the air cargo 
market—through what are usually called Open Skies Agreements—further reduces air transport 
costs around 8 percent.  
These results have important policy implications. Efforts aimed at improving the quality 
of regulation and the state of infrastructure (airports) have definite effects on the ability of local 
producers to compete in the global economy. Signing Open Skies Agreements has been difficult 
and strongly resisted, especially by airlines. This paper provides sound evidence that many 
economic sectors could benefit from a deregulated air cargo market.  
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Appendix A.  Data Description  
 
Air Transport Costs:  Corresponds to the import charge per unit of weight by type of commodity 
and by foreign country.  The variable was constructed with the information of import charges 
and weight reported by the U.S. Imports of Merchandise Database, of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau, 1990-2001.  Air transport costs per commodity are 
calculated at a 4-digit aggregated HS level.   
 
Control of Corruption: Measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the 
exercise of public power for private gain. Despite this straightforward focus, the particular aspect 
of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of 
“additional payments to get things done,” to the effects of corruption on the business 
environment, to measuring “grand corruption” in the political arena or in the tendency of elite 
forms to engage in “state capture.”. The presence of corruption is often a manifestation of a lack 
of respect of both the corrupter (typically a private citizen or firm) and the corrupted (typically a 
public official or politician) for the rules that govern their interactions, and hence represents a 
failure of governance according to our definition. This measure is obtained from Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003).  
 
Developed Country Dummy:  This dummy variable takes the value of one if the country is 
classified by the World Bank (2002) as a High Income Country and zero otherwise.  
 
Distance: Corresponds to the distance between the foreign airport I and the U.S. customs district 
J.  The geographic coordinates used to calculate the distance between the US customs district 
and the foreign airport were obtained from the CIA World Fact Book 2001.   
 
Directional Trade Imbalance: Corresponds to the ratio between the difference of U.S. exports 
and imports, and bilateral trade.  The variable was constructed with information on imports and 
exports reported by the U.S. Imports of Merchandise Database, of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau for year 2000.     
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Foreign Airport Infrastructure Index:  Corresponds to the logarithm of the ratio between the 
number of airports (square) with runways of at least 1500 meters long  ( ) c a  per country, and the 
product of country surface   and country population  ( c surf ) ( ) ct pop . 
 




















The number of runways per country was obtained from the CIA World Fact Book, 1990-2001. 
 
Government Efficiency:  Measures the quality of public service provision, the quality of the 
bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from 
political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. The main 
focus of this index is on “inputs” required for the government to be able to produce and 
implement good policies and deliver public goods. This variable was obtained from Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003). 
 
Number of Paved Roads: This variable was obtained from World Bank World Development 
Indicators, 2002. 
 
Open Sky Agreement Dummy Variable:  This dummy variable takes the value of one if there is 
an Open Skies Agreement between the U.S and the foreign country in that specific year.  The 
information was obtained from the U.S. Department of Transportation, 1990-2001.   
 
Population: This variable was obtained from World Bank World Development Indicators, 2002. 
 
Product Unit Value: Corresponds to the total value per unit of weight of U.S. imports calculated 
from foreign airports to each of the U.S. customs districts.  The variable was constructed with 
information on import value and weight reported by the U.S. Imports of Merchandise Database 
of the U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau, 1990-2001.  Product Unit Value 
is calculated at a 4-digit aggregated HS level.  
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Product Unit Weight:  Corresponds to the weight of U.S. imports from foreign airport to each 
U.S. customs district.  The variable was obtained from U.S. Imports of Merchandise Database, of 
the U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau, 1990-2001.  It is aggregated at a 4-
digit aggregated HS level. 
 
Real GDP: This variable was obtained from World Bank World Development Indicators, 2002. 
 
Real GDP per capita: This variable was obtained from World Bank World Development 
Indicators, 2002. 
 
Region: Corresponds to the U.S. customs district classification performed by the authors.  In 
Table B4 of Appendix B, there is a detailed description of the regions associated with each 
customs district. 
 
Regulatory Quality: Measures the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls 
or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive 
regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development. This measure is obtained 
from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003). 
 
Rule of Law: This variable was obtained from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003).  
 
Surface: This variable was obtained from World Bank World Development Indicators. 
 
Telephones: This variable was obtained from World Bank World Development Indicators, 2002. 
 
Total Liner Volume: Corresponds to the total value of imports transported between each foreign 
country and each U.S. customs district.  The variable was obtained from U.S. Imports of 
Merchandise Database of the U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau, 1990- 
2001.  It is aggregated at a 4-digit HS level. 
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Appendix B.  Data Used 
Table B1. Data by Country 
 
Country Infrastructure  Phones  Roads  Control 
of Corruption 
Government  
Efficiency  Rule of Law  Regulatory 
Quality 
Andorra 1.442  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1.358  1.294  1.548 
Afghanistan -25.513  0.182  -10.578  -1.469  -1.344  -1.544  -2.699 
Angola -1.483  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -1.354  -1.119  -1.435 
Albania -22.488  3.842  -5.665  -0.587  -0.534  -0.726  -0.232 
United Arab Emirates  -21.086  6.845  -12.232  0.702  0.584  1.096  0.690 
Argentina  -25.139  5.931 -7.688  -0.356 0.136  -0.011  0.284 
Armenia -24.012  5.053  -6.048  -0.699  -0.525  -0.432  -0.357 
Antigua and Barbuda  -17.214  6.667  -6.171  0.838  0.558  1.017  0.704 
Australia -26.442  6.879  -5.410  1.973  1.771  1.906  1.390 
Austria -23.648  7.113  -2.820  1.837  1.660  1.998  1.411 
Azerbaijan -23.111  5.070  -7.018 -1.030  -0.876  -0.847  -0.833 
Burundi -25.887  1.675  -6.726  -1.057  -1.131  -0.867  -1.121 
Belgium -21.264  6.931  -2.729  1.303  1.490  1.484  1.079 
Benin -27.265  2.862  -9.620  -0.527  -0.245  -0.320  -0.097 
Burkina  Faso -26.560  1.874 -9.890  -0.389 -0.403  -0.582  -0.191 
Bangladesh -27.695  1.608  -5.982  -0.649  -0.473  -0.705  -0.419 
Bulgaria -21.537  6.087  -6.476  -0.360  -0.400  -0.093  0.296 
Bahrain, Kingdom of  -18.596  6.310  -3.803  0.448  0.563  0.860  0.863 
Bahamas, The  -19.060  6.173  -6.036  0.815  0.950  1.048  0.997 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina -23.263  4.887  -6.052  -0.486  -0.764  -0.734  -1.207 
Belarus -21.770  5.612  -5.927  -0.577  -0.977  -1.036  -1.830 
Belize -22.423  5.388  -6.497  -0.129  -0.344  0.284  0.047 
Bermuda 1.442  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  1.092  1.294  1.282 
Bolivia -25.227  4.868  -8.046  -0.689  -0.366  -0.515  0.528 
Brazil -28.466  5.762  -6.183  -0.006  -0.189  -0.195  0.261 
Barbados -18.559  6.081  -3.575  1.294  1.358  0.767  0.688 
Brunei Darussalam  -21.301  6.281  -7.206  0.144  0.788  0.793  0.866 
Bhutan -0.282  2.976  -7.930  n.a.  0.585  0.898  -0.417 
Botswana 0.746  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.672  0.674  0.744 
Central African Rep.  -27.084  1.380  -8.315  -0.852  -1.040  -0.638  -0.572 
Canada -26.285  6.868  -5.854  2.208  1.890  1.888  1.322 
Switzerland -22.480  7.223  -4.031  2.234  2.230  2.166  1.374 
Chile -24.397  6.095  -7.489  1.364  1.223  1.271  1.337 
China, P.R.: 
Mainland  -28.167  5.180 -8.697  -0.240 0.179  -0.297  -0.196 
Côte d’Ivoire  -27.061  3.876  -7.603  -0.367  -0.508  -0.728  -0.136 
Cameroon -25.982  2.284  -8.680  -1.082  -0.655  -1.100  -0.417 
Congo, Republic of  -27.661  3.440  -8.747  -0.904  -1.232  -1.196  -0.917 
Colombia -26.444  5.405  -8.144  -0.471  -0.148  -0.625  0.242 
Comoros -20.942  2.303  -7.382  -0.711  -0.916  -0.944  -0.796 
Cape Verde  -21.298  5.145  -7.292  0.068  0.045  0.378  -0.309 
Costa Rica  -24.608  5.708  -5.018  0.841  0.408  0.738  0.797 
Cuba -22.292  3.788  -5.804  -0.186  -0.330  -0.691  -1.117 
Cayman Islands  1.442  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1.892  1.294  1.548 
Cyprus -18.777  6.875  -4.032  1.206  1.118  0.825  1.013 
Czech Republic  -22.430  6.687  -5.555 0.415  0.681 0.641  0.885 
Germany 1.358  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  1.753  1.846  1.836 
Djibouti -22.021  2.745  -7.470  -0.840  -0.985  -0.443  -0.500 
Dominica -0.042  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.534  0.002  0.008 
Denmark -21.751  7.208  -3.788  2.320  1.909  1.964  1.473 
Dominican Republic  0.161  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.398  -0.387  -0.290 
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Table B1., continued 
Country Infrastructure  Phones  Roads  Control of 
Corruption 
Government 
Efficiency  Rule of Law  Regulatory 
Quality 
Algeria -24.746  4.091  -8.809  -0.590  -0.746  -0.677  -0.799 
Ecuador -24.992  4.928  -7.537  -0.867  -0.854  -0.573  -0.175 
Egypt -23.961  4.680  -9.652  -0.154  -0.081  0.178  -0.092 
Eritrea -22.857  2.067  -10.156  0.150  -0.125  -0.214  -0.447 
Spain 1.223  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1.665  1.357  1.260 
Estonia -23.395  6.620  -3.086  0.488  0.670  0.601  1.222 
Ethiopia -26.014  1.356  -11.075  -0.401  -0.554  -0.347  -0.670 
Finland 1.618  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1.870  2.390  2.038 
Fiji -23.420  5.157  -7.134  0.279 -0.070  -0.345  -0.501 
France -23.541  6.978  -3.702  1.490  1.541  1.457  0.991 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.  -0.728  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.391  -0.319  -0.547 
Gabon -25.096  4.864  -8.395  -0.830  -0.661  -0.397  -0.182 
United Kingdom  -22.775  7.182  -4.645  2.060  2.056  1.906  1.635 
Georgia -21.977  5.150  -6.739  -0.846  -0.545  -0.815  -0.735 
Ghana -29.111  2.898  -7.948  -0.424  -0.050  -0.120  -0.035 
Guinea -26.845  2.575  -7.580  -0.367  -0.527  -0.870  -0.177 
Gambia, The  -23.291  3.394  -7.489  -0.271  -0.205  -0.200  -0.536 
Guinea-Bissau -24.241  2.219  -7.463  -0.625  -1.005  -1.276  -0.852 
Equatorial Guinea  -23.274  2.595  -7.343  -1.482  -1.565  -1.383  -1.496 
Greece -21.757  6.993  -4.600 0.642  0.731  0.737  0.876 
Grenada  -17.322  5.934 -3.428  0.279 -0.084  0.328  0.178 
Guatemala -25.069  4.772  -8.731 -0.744  -0.447  -0.728  0.294 
Guyana 0.008  4.834  -7.766  n.a.  -0.212  -0.361  -0.120 
China,P.R.:Hong 
Kong  1.662 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1.445 1.506  1.576 
Honduras -25.103  4.248  -8.264  -0.767  -0.589  -0.776  0.056 
Croatia  -22.065  5.442 -5.736  -0.132 0.105  -0.071  0.179 
Haiti -26.114  2.186  -9.447  -1.123 -1.352  -1.352  -1.050 
Hungary -22.424  6.513  -3.263  0.658  0.708  0.790  0.981 
Indonesia -0.206  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.390  -0.920  -0.753 
India -0.178  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.117  -0.229  0.126 
Ireland -24.903  6.982  -3.419  1.772  1.714  1.766  1.542 
Iran, I.R. of  -1.394  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.310  -0.599  -0.558 
Iceland -24.062  7.148  -5.122  2.159  1.813  1.898  1.039 
Israel -20.974  7.076  -6.184  1.278  1.009  1.062  0.930 
Italy -23.187  7.099  -4.301  0.779  0.863  0.919  0.855 
Jamaica -22.687  5.832  -4.401  -0.307  -0.323  -0.240  0.441 
Jordan -21.668  5.019  -9.022  0.059  0.375  0.422  0.340 
Japan 0.756  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1.099  1.261  1.617 
Kazakhstan -27.432  4.830  -8.711  -0.894  -0.700  -0.788  -0.461 
Kenya -26.888  2.678  -8.340  -1.007  -0.737  -0.953  -0.317 
Kyrgyz Republic  -24.799  4.367  -7.921  -0.781  -0.562  -0.766  -0.455 
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Table B1., continued 
Country Infrastructure  Phones  Roads  Control of 
Corruption 
Government 
Efficiency  Rule of Law  Regulatory 
Quality 
Cambodia -26.997  2.507  -9.545  -0.903  -0.642  -0.797  -0.227 
Kiribati -0.841  3.808  -4.994  n.a.  -0.194  -0.531  -0.426 
St. Kitts and Nevis  0.177  6.397  -4.971 n.a.  -0.052 0.175  0.134 
Korea -23.180  6.938  -6.425  0.368  0.606  0.779  0.542 
Kuwait -21.516  6.200  -7.488  0.901  0.142  0.943  0.048 
Lao People’s 
Dem.Rep  -1.168 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.482  -0.933  -1.108 
Lebanon 0.117  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  -0.132  -0.339  -0.114 
Liberia -26.432  0.742  -7.895  -1.301  -1.655  -1.692  -2.010 
St. Lucia  -18.371  5.797  -4.174  0.303  0.074  0.134  0.177 
Liechtenstein 1.688  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 1.625  1.294  1.548 
Sri Lanka  0.386  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.273  -0.159  0.057 
Lesotho -0.319  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.058  -0.029  -0.129 
Lithuania -22.618  6.137  -3.745  0.118  0.303  0.199  0.493 
Luxembourg 1.552  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 2.067  1.973  1.923 
Latvia  -21.556  6.150 -3.313  -0.131 0.297  0.244  0.628 
Macao, China  0.704  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  0.825 -0.074  0.752 
Morocco -24.636  4.889  -8.255  0.108  0.083  0.289  0.156 
Moldova -0.409  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  -0.673  -0.615  -0.335 
Madagascar -0.232  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  -0.469  -0.278  -0.662 
Maldives 0.325  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  0.538  -0.371  -0.293 
Mexico 0.600  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.146  -0.340  -0.267 
Marshall Islands  -0.637  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.507  -0.133  -0.438 
Macedonia, FYR  -23.281  5.743  -6.529  -0.607  -0.375  -0.395  -0.082 
Mali -26.994  1.465  -10.968  -0.437  -0.680  -0.633  -0.043 
Malta -18.642  6.702  -3.201  0.497  0.984  0.640  0.558 
Myanmar -1.377  1.755  -10.584  n.a.  -1.287  -1.252  -1.268 
Mongolia -23.538  4.614  -7.345  -0.121  -0.079  0.265  -0.085 
Mozambique -27.042  1.931 -9.616  -0.671  -0.362  -0.892  -0.493 
Mauritania -25.417  2.282  -10.749  -0.254  -0.188  -0.466  -0.315 
Martinique 0.950  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.825  0.838  1.282 
Mauritius -21.602  5.956  -6.476 0.426  0.561 0.846  0.420 
Malawi -0.167  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.648  -0.639  -0.386 
Malaysia 0.547  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  0.794  0.447  0.686 
Namibia -24.417  4.695  -5.791  0.582  0.334  0.784  0.340 
Niger -28.864  0.689  -11.809  -0.796  -0.877  -0.874  -0.548 
Nigeria -26.715  1.518  -8.026  -1.149  -1.162  -1.213  -0.743 
Nicaragua -25.760  3.892  -7.438  -0.546  -0.662  -0.750  0.027 
Netherlands 1.688  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  2.165  2.242  1.916 
Norway -22.822  7.157  -5.104  2.082  1.814  2.042  1.248 
Nepal -0.345  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.621  -0.392  -0.350 
New Zealand  -25.460  6.969  -4.797  2.313  1.820  2.011  1.594 
Oman -21.826  5.034  -6.159  0.689  0.877  1.104  0.578 
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Table B1., continued 
Country Infrastructure  Phones  Roads  Control of 
Corruption 
Government 
Efficiency  Rule of Law  Regulatory 
Quality 
Pakistan -0.470  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  -0.514  -0.773  -0.611 
Panama 0.801  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.185  -0.338  0.051 
Peru -24.531  4.713  -8.729  -0.145  -0.179  -0.434  0.554 
Philippines  -26.352  4.823 -6.314  -0.433 0.086  -0.287  0.373 
Papua New Guinea  -28.474  2.595  -8.707  -0.738  -0.633  -0.446  -0.558 
Poland -23.044  6.123  -4.483  0.433  0.581  0.574  0.612 
Korea, Dem. Rep.  -22.528  3.822  -7.921  -0.743  -1.041  -1.068  -1.874 
Portugal -22.413  6.999  -5.267  1.360  1.117  1.261  1.230 
Paraguay -25.639  5.006  -7.828  -0.914  -1.063  -0.800  -0.288 
Qatar -21.199  6.152  -8.355  0.598  0.721  1.060  0.307 
Romania -24.144  5.658  -4.875  -0.342  -0.519  -0.211  -0.091 
Russia -23.864  5.482  -9.068  -0.831  -0.517  -0.804  -0.657 
Rwanda -0.840  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.720  -0.340  -0.807 
Saudi Arabia  -0.039  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.106  0.174  0.670 
Sudan -27.539  2.576  -13.165  -0.994  -1.385  -1.295  -1.148 
Senegal -28.238  3.869  -9.064  -0.344  -0.042  -0.227  -0.267 
Singapore -19.423  7.063  -5.563 2.340  2.341  2.030  1.939 
Solomon Islands  -1.101  3.002  -8.819  n.a.  -0.965  -0.543  -0.772 
Sierra Leone  -26.610  1.850  -7.940  -0.962  -0.966  -0.926  -1.060 
El Salvador  -25.591  5.385  -7.165  -0.436  -0.263  -0.390  0.794 
Somalia -25.178  0.405  -9.330  -1.450  -2.138  -1.791  -2.377 
São Tomé & Principe  -0.514  3.431  -7.235  n.a.  -0.754  -0.293  -0.696 
Suriname  -24.898  5.591 -8.078  0.036 -0.126  -0.611  -0.772 
Slovak Republic  -23.064  6.253  -4.958  0.206  0.235  0.240  0.397 
Slovenia -23.026  6.906  -4.588  0.942  0.679  0.844  0.645 
Sweden -23.648  7.244  -4.393  2.328  1.789  1.943  1.357 
Swaziland -0.062  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.418  -0.222  -0.143 
Seychelles -0.960  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.606  0.131  -0.041 
Syrian Arab Republic  -0.955  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.796  -0.568  -0.371 
Chad  -27.129  -0.330 -9.069  -0.820 -0.495  -0.725  -0.527 
Togo -24.843  2.996  -8.379  -0.677  -0.954  -0.863  -0.427 
Thailand  -25.399  4.960 -8.914  -0.227 0.228  0.398  0.417 
Tajikistan -24.270  3.578  -7.026  -1.214  -1.310  -1.319  -1.555 
Turkmenistan -2.234  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -1.384  -1.205  -1.152 
Tonga -18.094  4.591  -5.050  -0.319  -0.493  -0.653  -0.689 
Trinidad and Tobago  -21.235  5.811  -4.569  0.188  0.415  0.385  0.650 
Tunisia 0.282  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.803  0.279  0.314 
Turkey -24.026  6.264  -5.821  -0.154  -0.162  0.070  0.391 
Taiwan Prov.of 
China 1.019  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1.222  0.783  0.989 
Tanzania -28.252  2.306  -8.250  -0.980  -0.567  -0.416  -0.194 
Uganda -26.335  2.415  -8.700  -0.731  -0.239  -0.602  0.156 
Ukraine -22.149  2.786  -6.906  -0.881  -0.778  -0.725  -0.819 
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Table B1., continued 
Country Infrastructure  Phones  Roads  Control of 
Corruption 
Government 
Efficiency  Rule of Law  Regulatory 
Quality 
Uruguay -27.093  6.017  -8.887  0.589  0.594  0.553  0.830 
Uzbekistan -27.761  4.238  -7.339 -0.928  -1.029  -1.020  -1.547 
St. Vincent & Grens.  0.129  5.482  -3.725  n.a.  -0.095  0.175  0.243 
Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  -25.275  5.785  -7.743  -0.745  -0.886  -0.776  -0.267 
Vietnam -26.076  3.730  -7.985  -0.662  -0.236  -0.602  -0.606 
Vanuatu -21.599  3.571  -7.649  -0.319  -0.451  -0.426  -0.379 
West Bank and Gaza  -0.178  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.183  0.089  0.472 
Samoa -19.992  n.a.  3.857  n.a.  -6.648  n.a.  n.a. 
Yemen, Republic of  -0.525  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.632  -0.549  -0.946 
Serbia and 
Montenegro -24.739  5.854  -6.999  -0.924  -0.829  -0.993  -1.108 
South Africa  -26.457  5.716  -5.988  0.466  0.315  0.259  0.313 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of  -28.488  -0.527  -8.452  -1.563  -1.772  -1.820  -2.387 
Zambia -26.427  2.856  -7.428  -0.825  -0.729  -0.414  0.083 
Zimbabwe -25.998  3.721  -9.584 -0.586  -0.833  -0.570  -1.148 
 
Source: Infrastructure, Telephones and Phones are the indexes calculated by the authors.  Control of 
Corruption, Government Efficiency, Rule of Law and Regulatory Quality were obtained from Kauffmann 
(2003).  The information used to construct the airport infrastructure index was obtained from CIA World Fact 
Book, 1990 - 2001, and the World Bank World Development Indicators (2002).  The indexes of Roads and 
Telephones were constructed using the information of phones, roads, surface and population available in the 
World Development Indicators (2002), World Bank.  The first three variables are in logarithms. All the 
indexes reported are only for the year 2000. 
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  Tables B2 and B3 present the summary statistics for the variables used for the year 2000 
and for the whole sample, respectively. 
 
Table B2.  Summary Statistics Year  2000 
Variable: Obs.  Mean  SD  Pct.5  Pct.  95 
Log Value of Air Transport Costs per Unit of Weight  116620 0.864  1.298  -1.296  2.736 
Total Volume (ln)  116620 21.857  1.865  17.939  23.787 
Product Unit Value (ln)  116620 3.765  1.602  1.396  6.604 
Unbalance 116620 -0.048  0.350  -0.727  0.548 
Distance (ln)  116620 8.916  0.552  7.951  9.578 
Open Sky Agreement  116620 0.560  0.496  0.000  1.000 
Airport Inf.  116620 -23.937 2.091  -28.167  -20.974 
Regulatory Quality  116620 0.896  0.624  -0.196  1.635 
Gov. Effectiveness  116620 1.084  0.880  -0.473  2.230 
Developed Countries  116620 0.634  0.482  0.000  1.000 
 
 
Table B3.  Summary Statistics Whole Sample (1990 - 2001) 
Variable: Obs.  Mean  SD  Pct.5  Pct.  95
Log Value of Air transport costs per unit of weight  1830170  0.980  1.226  -0.997 2.788 
Total Volume (ln)  1830170  17.418 1.660 14.179 19.296
Product Unit Value (ln)  1830170  3.739  1.557  1.426  6.470 
Unbalance 1829563  -0.078  0.331  -0.727 0.509 
Distance  (ln)  1830170  8.945 0.545 7.879  9.579 
Open Sky Agreement  1830170  0.292  0.455  0.000  1.000 
Airport Inf.  1605448  -23.926 2.032 -28.060 -21.239
Regulatory Quality  1826134  0.936  0.622  -0.196 1.662 
Gov. Effectiveness  1826134  1.133  0.855  -0.447 2.230 
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Table B4. Regions Associated with Each U.S. Customs District 
 
U.S. Regions 
District of Entry  Region District Code
Baltimore, MD  1  13 
Boston, MA  1  4 
Buffalo, NY  1  9 
Chicago, IL  1  39 
Cleveland, OH  1  41 
Detroit, MI  1  38 
New York, NY  1  10 
Norfolk, VA  1  14 
Ogdensburg,  NY 1 7 
Philadelphia, PA.  1  11 
Portland, ME  1  1 
Providence, RI  1  5 
St. Albans, VT  1  2 
St. Louis, MO  1  45 
Washington, DC  1  54 
Charleston, SC  2  16 
El Paso, TX  2  24 
Houston, TX  2  53 
Laredo, TX  2  23 
Miami, FL  2  52 
Milwaukee, WI  2  37 
Mobile, AL  2  19 
New  Orleans,  LA 2 20 
Port Arthur, TX  2  21 
Savannah, GA  2  17 
Tampa, FL  2  18 
Wilmington, NC  2  15 
Fort Worth, TX  2  55 
Columbia-Snake, OR  3  29 
Duluth, MN  3  36 
Great Falls, MT  3  33 
Los Angeles, CA  3  27 
Minneapolis, MN  3  35 
Nogales, AZ.  3  26 
Pembina, ND  3  34 
San Diego, CA  3  25 
San Francisco, CA  3  28 
Seattle, WA  3  30 
Source: U.S. Imports of Merchandise Database, 
U.S. Department of Commerce.   
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Table 1. Determinants of Air Transport Costs  
Dependent Variable: Log Value of Air Transport Costs per Unit of Weight 
 
Variables:                 
                 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Distance  (ln) 0.197 0.208 0.196 0.191 0.184 0.182 0.199 0.185
  (0.035)*** (0.033)***   
           
         
                 
   
           
           
         
 
        
         
      
      
        
    
          
                 
(0.038)*** (0.037)*** (0.034)*** (0.032)*** (0.033)*** (0.035)***
Total Volume (ln)  -0.031  -0.032  -0.032 -0.016 -0.018 -0.025 -0.029 -0.017
  (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.015) (0.013) (0.014)* (0.011)*** (0.012)
Product  Unit  Value 0.485 0.491 0.483 0.488 0.489 0.488 0.485 0.489
  (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)***
Unbalance -0.156  -0.138  -0.160  -0.108 -0.098 -0.110 -0.164 -0.102
  (0.059)*** (0.053)*** (0.064)** (0.056)* (0.042)** (0.043)** (0.057)*** (0.045)**
Airport Inf.  -0.041  -0.066    -0.030 -0.025 -0.025 -0.037 -0.024
  (0.011)*** (0.014)***    (0.012)** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.011)*** (0.009)***






-0.066    0.065 
(0.029)**    (0.061) 
Regulatory Quality 
 
-0.121 -0.193   -0.118 
(0.034)*** (0.075)**    (0.037)***
Open Sky Agreement  -0.048 -0.017
                     (0.042)  (0.038) 
Observations 116620 116620 116620 116620 116620 116620 116620 116620
R-squared                 












  IV    Tel & Road 
  F Test, Reg. Qual. & Gov. Eff. = 0  7.078 
Prob > F                 0.001       
 Clustered Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 2. Determinants of Air Transport Costs 
Dependent Variable: Log Value of Air Transport Costs per Unit of Weight 
 
Variables:               
               
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Distance  (ln) 0.181 0.191 0.179 0.179 0.181 0.179 0.177
  (0.034)*** (0.036)*** (0.035)*** (0.034)*** 
 
(0.034)*** (0.035)*** (0.036)***
Total Volume (ln)  -0.008  -0.014  -0.007       
             
             
             
     
 
      
       
       
       
        
        
         
 
               
-0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Product Unit Value  0.490  0.491  0.489  0.490  0.490  0.490  0.490 
  (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** 
 
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)***
Unbalance -0.095 -0.102 -0.092 -0.082 -0.097 -0.083 -0.079
  (0.049)* (0.053)* (0.051)* (0.044)* (0.052)* (0.048)* (0.045)*
Airport Inf.  -0.024  -0.042    -0.020 -0.024 -0.020  
  (0.010)** (0.016)***   (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.009)**  
Airport Inf.  (Lagged 5 years) 
 




-0.076    -0.076 -0.080
(0.043)*    (0.043)* (0.044)*
Open Sky Agreement 
 
-0.005 -0.001  
(0.036) (0.034)  
Dummy Developed Country.  -0.176  -0.128  -0.191 -0.109 -0.175 -0.109 -0.120
   (0.035)*** (0.046)*** (0.034)*** (0.051)** (0.036)*** (0.051)** (0.051)**
Observations 116620 116620 116620 116620 116620 116620 116620
R-squared  0.341              0.341 0.341 0.342 0.341 0.342 0.341
Instrumental Variables     Tel & Road               
Clustered Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3. Determinants of Air Transport Costs 
Dependent Variable: Log Value of Air Transport Costs per Unit of Weight 
 
Variables:                    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total  Volume(ln)                    -0.014 -0.023 -0.005 -0.010 -0.062 0.068 -0.076 0.043 -0.097
  (0.045)                  (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.034)* (0.073) (0.048) (0.065) (0.052)*
Product  Unit  Value                    0.501 0.501 0.501 0.503 0.505 0.502 0.512 0.502 0.512
 (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)***
Open  Sky  Agreement                  -0.027 -0.024 -0.019 -0.018 -0.027 -0.085 -0.132 -0.022 -0.070
 (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.010)*  (0.011)** (0.010)*  (0.037)**       (0.042)*** (0.044) (0.048)
Open  Sky  Agreement              -0.016  -0.018
       *Years since signed
1            (0.009)*  (0.007)**
Airport Inf.                  0.003 -0.067  -0.073
                 (0.011) (0.037)* (0.037)*
Year                  -0.022 0.335     -0.022 -0.004 -0.020 -0.002
(0.006)*** (0.064)***     (0.009)*** (0.007) (0.008)** (0.008)
year  (square)              -0.002  
      (0.000)***                     
Observations                    1747483 1747483 1747483 1747483 1601247 276858 221903 276858 221903
R-squared  0.422                  0.423 0.423 0.433 0.430 0.465 0.487 0.465 0.487
Sample  1990 - 2001  1990 & 2001
2 
Region  Fixed  Effect              Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District of entry Fixed Effect        Yes            
Year Fixed Effect        Yes  Yes  Yes             
         
 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1: Open Sky Dummy interacted with the number of years since the agreement was signed. 
2: Columns 6 to 9 include data only for 1990 and 2001 for countries that are in the whole period. 
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Table 4. Determinants of Air Transport Costs 
Dependent Variable: Log Value of Air Transport Costs per Unit of Weight 
 
Variables:  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total  Volume(ln)  -0.056 -0.057 -0.084 -0.090 
 (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.033)**  (0.033)*** 
Product Unit Value  0.500  0.500  0.505  0.505 
  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Airport Inf.      0.003  0.002 
     (0.011)  (0.011) 
Open Sky Agreement  -0.009  -0.009  -0.016  -0.017 
       *Year signed  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)* 
One  Year  After  -0.018 -0.019 -0.028 -0.029 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.015)*  (0.015)* 
Two Years After  -0.029  -0.031  -0.040  -0.042 
 (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.023)*  (0.023)* 
Three  Years  After  -0.043 -0.044 -0.053 -0.055 
  (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.022)** (0.022)** 
Four Years After    -0.058    -0.037 
   (0.023)**  (0.018)** 
Four of More Years After  -0.074    -0.061   
  (0.020)***  (0.017)***  
Five or More Years After    -0.088    -0.081 
      (0.025)***     (0.019)*** 
Observations  1695944 1695944 1554189 1554189 
R-squared  0.420 0.420 0.427 0.427 
Sample  1990 - 2001 
Fixed Effect 
 













Clustered Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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